An Analysis of British Workfare Policies, 1997-2012

By Leander Jones

 Introduction

 This essay will seek to explain various issues surrounding “workfare” in Britain, with reference to the nexus between the power resources of capital, as posited by Marxist theories, and the interdependent power available to all participants in the cooperative relationships that constitute social life, as explicated by Piven. It begins by defining the term “workfare”, and then describes how it was initiated and expanded under New Labour and the current Coalition Government. It then goes on to explain, from a Marxist perspective, why workfare was implemented. This analysis begins with an explication of the structural and ideological power of capital over the state. This is followed by Jessop's argument about the transition that has taken place from the post-War Keynesian Welfare State to a Schumpeterian Workfare State, which explains how this power has translated into a new policy paradigm which prioritises international competitiveness above other social and economic goals. It then demonstrates how workfare programmes are in-keeping with this over-arching objective. The next section of the essay examines the reasons why there has been a subsequent partial reversal of workfare. It utilises Piven's theory of interdependent power to illustrate why consumers and protesters successfully managed to force many of the companies involved to withdraw their support for the schemes, which indirectly led to a backtracking by the Government due to, again, the structural power of capital.  

What is workfare and what shape has it taken in contemporary Britain?

 Workfare must be defined in contradistinction to traditional welfare, as established in Britain in the post-War settlement. Traditional welfare involved the “decommodification” of elements of social life, i.e. the withdrawal of numerous social areas from market relations. This separated the entitlement to welfare from the obligation to work. Workfare, in contrast, means the “recommodification” of welfare; one's entitlements are defined according to one's relation to the processes of production. Under such a system people's benefits are generally conditional upon them working (Holden, 2003, pp. 303-316; Jessop, 1993, pp. 7-40; Open University, date unknown a). The “New Deal” brought in by Labour in 1997 marked the first moves towards a workfare ethos in Britain (Clark and O'Reilly, 2011; Open University a). Their “welfare-to-work” schemes included Working Families Tax Credits, which increased in-work benefits so that work was significantly more rewarding than remaining on out-of-work benefits, and the New Deal for Young People, which made receiving benefits after six months of unemployment conditional on engaging in a programme of subsidised employment, training, or volunteering. These combined financial incentives with a degree of compulsion to work (Aufheben, 2011; Holden, 2003, pp. 303-316). A further significant shift towards workfare came with the 2007 and 2009 Welfare Reform Acts, which aimed to impose work on benefit claimants who had previously been permitted to stay out of the labour market, such as the sick and single parents, and which also entailed a “work for the dole” scheme for the long-term unemployed (Aufheben, 2011; Trickey and Walker, 2001, pp. 181-191). The current Coalition Government expanded workfare substantially with the introduction of five different compulsory work schemes: Mandatory Work Activity; The Work Programme; Sector-based Work Academies; the Community Activity Programme; and the Work Experience Programme. These vary with regard to who they are aimed at, as well as what conditions accompany them, in terms of what sanctions they entail (how long benefits are frozen for non-compliance) and what type of work they promote, and for what duration. The Work Experience programme is a slight anomaly in that the scheme is voluntary, but sanctions are applied after one week of taking up a place (Ball, 2012; BW, 2012; CAB, date unknown; Jacob, 2012). These programmes are a significant change to workfare as it existed under Labour. They have increased the length of mandatory work placements (from a previous maximum of two weeks to up to six months), and have extended the “welfare-to-work” providers' control over the lives of the unemployed to two years (who remain registered even once they have found work). Moreover referrals have been put on loop, so on completion of a period of mandated work people are not returned to the normal requirements of the jobseeker's agreement (neither is there any guarantee of a job at the end of it); they can thus remain on the programme indefinitely. The placements can also take place in private businesses, and “for the profit of the host organisation”, whereas they were previously restricted to charities and public bodies (BW, 2012; Clark and O'Reilly, 2011; Malik, 2012c). The supposed rationale behind workfare is that such schemes are necessary to tackle unemployment by instilling a work ethic, routine, and discipline in the long-term unemployed. It will also supposedly make such people more appealing to prospective employers (DWP, 2011). However, the Government have since done a partial U-turn, removing the sanctions from the Work Experience scheme, while the status of some of the other schemes are as yet uncertain (BW, 2012; Malik, 2012d). The reason for this change of heart will be examined below.  


The power of capital and the implementation of workfare

 Structural power of capital

 Marxist state theories maintain that capital has not only economic, but also political, power, due to its position relative to the state; this goes a long way towards explaining the implementation of workfare. On the one hand the state relies on capital as a central source of funding, without which it could not perform its central functions. It relies on the bond markets for borrowing, and on tax revenues for long-term expenditure. Thus capital can constrain state policy through (threatening) relocation, investment strikes, or raising interest rates on loans to the Government. All of these actions are readily available to capitalists, especially when compared with the equivalents available to labour, such as wide-ranging strikes or protests, which require the (arduous) mobilisation of large numbers of people (Gill and Law, 1989, pp. 475-499; Ward, 1987, pp. 593-610; WGPI, 2008b). Another reason for capital's power over the state is ideological. The hegemonic discourse in modern economies prioritises economic growth above all (or most) other objectives, and meeting this goal is often necessary for state elites to win elections. Furthermore, it is believed that private sector investment, innovation and accumulation is necessarily and inevitably the main source of growth. These ideas result in the interests of capital being accorded a higher value than other interests, as Governments try to cultivate a good “business climate”. This in turn gives businesspeople credibility in their dealings with Government, because they are able to “claim an expertise of public value”. Additionally, business tends to derive power from maintaining contacts with government and controlling the majority of the mass media (Gill and Law, 1989, pp. 475-499).


From post-War Keynesianism to the Schumpeterian Workfare State

Prevailing understandings of what constitutes an appropriate “business climate” will change over time, in line with the development of institutional practices, structural changes in the market and discursive shifts (Ward, 1987, pp. 593-610). The general restructuring of the economy that has taken place since the 1970s, associated with globalisation and a post-Fordist accumulation regime, has moulded Government economic and social policy in contemporary Britain. It has led to, according to Jessop, a decline in the Keynesian state form and its associated welfare-state policy paradigm, and a move towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State (SWS). The former was “epitomised by the pursuit of full employment through demand management in relatively closed national economies”. The latter has abandoned these commitments, differing in two main respects. In economic policy, the SWS is concerned with promoting “product, process, organizational, and market innovation”, and structural competitiveness, through supply-side intervention (Holden, 2003, pp. 303-316; Jessop, 1993, pp. 7-40). This change has resulted from national money now largely functioning as international currency. This is relevant in two main senses. During the post-War Keynesian era, wages served primarily as a source of demand due to the national focus of production. Thus it was in the interest of capital for wages to be kept relatively high, increasing in line with profits, as this allowed full capacity utilisation in closed economies. In contrast, the internationalisation of markets means that wages have come to be viewed primarily as costs of production. Additionally, globalisation has resulted in an increase in cross-border flows of financial capital. This means that national economies are increasingly vulnerable to volatile currency movements – and the strength of national money depends to a significant extent on the competitive strength of the national economy. State intervention in the economy thus tends to focus on supply-side factors, as demand management has become increasingly difficult. For these reasons, public spending has generally come to be used to further productive and competitive needs (Jessop, 1993, pp. 7-40). This is believed to necessitate policies of low taxation, low inflation, competitive wages, and flexible labour-markets. Secondly, social policy has been tied in with, and subordinated to, these goals; it is now used as a further tool for increasing labour-market flexibility and structural competitiveness. One element of this has been the “recommodification” of welfare. Welfare is no longer about extending the social rights of citizens; the needs of business are prioritised above the needs of individuals. In sum, the rise of the SWS has been accompanied, and reinforced, by changes in economic discourse and ideology, which have fed into workfare policies (Holden, 2003, pp. 303-316; Jessop, 1993, pp. 7-40).

 Workfare programmes serve the needs of the SWS model because they help to maintain an effective “reserve army of labour”. A central goal of SWS is to keep inflation low and wages competitive, and the belief is that, in order to do so, a certain level of unemployment must exist in the economy. The logic is that full employment leads to capital having to compete for labour, meaning effectively a shortage in its supply, which drives up wages, and also places unions in a strong bargaining position from which they can increase wages even further, generating inflation. Marx also recognised that this would be the case. He argued that capitalism will therefore maintain a reserve army of (unemployed) labour, which would mean a consistent over-supply of workers and constant competition for the available jobs, keeping wages down and weakening organised labour. The level of unemployment that will yield a “stable rate of inflation” is known as the Natural Accelerating Rate of Unemployment (Baker, 2000, p. 1; Christensen, 2000, p. 4; Jacob, 2010; Marx, 1999). Thatcher broke with the post-War tradition of striving to achieve full employment, and deliberately allowed mass redundancies. The unforeseen consequence of this policy agenda was that it created a pool of long-term unemployed people by the end of her time in office. The long-term unemployed however do not serve as an effective reserve army because of their general “reduced job-search activity..., and employer reluctance to employ them” due to their (at least perceived) recalcitrance and lack of discipline. Workfare programmes represent an attempt to reinvigorate this reserve army so that they can effectively put pressure on the labour market. David Blunkett openly stated that this way “firms have more potential recruits to choose from, wage pressure is diminished and non-inflationary growth is promoted” (Aufheben, 2011; Christensen, 2000, p. 3-15; Holden, 2003, pp. 303-316).

When there is a shortage of labour, as was the case when Labour devised its Welfare Reform Acts due to the flourishing economic situation prior to the financial crisis (the implementation of the 2009 addition could not be easily reversed due to the uncompleted plans already made with the private workfare providers), there is arguably some validity to the claim that international competitiveness necessitates that inflation and wages do not outstrip the levels in other countries. However, over a million people were thrown into unemployment as a result of the crisis, thus creating a surplus of workers (there are at least six jobseekers per vacancy) – who were skilled, healthy, and willing to work. In such a situation there is no urgent need for legislation designed to force the unfit into the labour market (Aufheben, 2011; Jacob, 2012). Yet it was in this context that the Coalition Government expanded workfare, suggesting an additional reason for their programmes.

 The Coalition Government's workfare programmes benefit capital also by undercutting workers in normal employment; it creates the potential for employers to replace existing workers with much cheaper labour. This is likely to undermine labour laws and workers' rights due to the insecurity it would engender among workers, which would discourage unionisation and strike action. It could also in the long-term lead to a decline in the number of people in paid work as they are substituted for workfare wardens doing the same tasks, which in turn would increase the size of the reserve army of labour and competition for existing jobs, depressing wages further (Clark and O'Reilly, 2011; Jacob, 2010). Marx explains how the logic of capital accumulation means that business must always remain competitive, or risk failure. Companies employing this unpaid labour would be afforded a competitive advantage, which would encourage competitors to cut costs by doing the same in response. There is already evidence that such substitution has been taking place since the Government introduced its schemes. This is particularly the case with overtime for permanent retail workers, as well as the filling of Christmas vacancies. In some cases, jobs have been replaced entirely; for example with station staff on the London Underground (BW, 2012; Clark and O'Reilly, 2011; Marx in Sawaya, 2011, p. 9). Workfare thus enhances labour market “flexibility”, and puts downwards pressure on overall wage levels.

In contrast to the relative cautiousness of New Labour, the apparent zealousness of the Coalition Government to not only maintain an effective reserve army of labour, but to undercut existing workers, can be explained by their different societal objectives; their approach is largely Neo-liberal in character. This emphasises, among other things, privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation, and “hire-and-fire, flexi-time, and flexi-wage labour markets”. It is underpinned by a belief in the inherent efficiency and self-equilibrating nature of the unrestricted free market. These ideas have fed into the Government's understanding about how to engender post-recessionary recovery. Labour's approach seems to be more in-keeping with Neo-statism. This sees room for state involvement in the market to increase supply-side competitiveness, promoting “sunrise sectors”, technological advancement, training and education, and emphasises a “flexi-skill” above a “flexi-price” labour market (Gamble, 1989, pp. 350-361; Jessop, 1993, pp. 7-40). The important point however is that, while the two parties maintained ideological differences, their strategies can both be understood in the context of the emergent SWS. This has been accompanied by a new set of (perceived) constraints and opportunities to those of the Keynesian era, which lends to (some form of) welfare recommodification.


 Piven's theory of interdependent power

However, the Marxist argument set out above, which posits that the implementation of workfare derives ultimately from the extensive power resources of capital, cannot, by itself, explain the subsequent partial reversal of Government policy. To this end we must to Frances Piven's theory of interdependent power.


What is interdependent power?

 Power resources are the means available to actors for exerting power over others – for influencing or coercing their behaviour in a desired manner, even against their resistance. Those most commonly identified include skills and expertise, leadership qualities, the occupancy of positions of authority, wealth, prestige, and control of the instruments of physical coercion. The latter three are widely considered to be the key elements, as they are reliable bases for dominating others. One type of resource can typically be used to gain another, and as such they tend to determine social hierarchies; they are by definition concentrated among those of higher social rank (Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14; WGPI, 2008a). However this resource perspective cannot explain why at times people of lower social rank, without wealth or status etc., do sometimes prevail in contests with the powerful, and have historically been able to impose institutional reforms for their own benefit. Such resources therefore cannot be the only means of exercising power, because otherwise the weak would be incapable of resistance (Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14). Frances Piven argues that such scenarios are made possible through the exercise of a different kind of power, based not on resources but on the interdependent relations which comprise social life. Societal functions are organised through “networks of cooperative relations”, and all people who contribute towards these relations have potential power over those that depend upon them. This type of power is not concentrated among a certain group in society, but is, by its nature, widespread (Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53; Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14; WGPI, 2008a). Power resources only translate into power if they are perceived as such; power is not a corporeal phenomenon, but is the result of interaction. Resources are only relevant to the extent that they are integral to interdependent relationships, and thus what counts as a resource changes over time as the nature of these interdependencies change. For example, control over capital is an effective power resource only because people are embedded in a set of economic relations where the majority are “dependent on entrepreneurs for the means of production and subsistence”. The activation of interdependent power entails the ability to “disrupt” these cooperative relationships (Lendman, 2008; WGPI, 2008b). Thus while control over investment and employment gives capitalists power over workers, and they can exert leverage through lockouts or blacklists or capital flight for example, workers have potential power over capitalists because production depends on their labour, and they can engage in sabotage, slowdowns, and strikes. Similarly, state elites in democratic societies write the laws and have monopoly control over the legitimate means of violence, but they also depend on the public's votes to remain in office. Even the unemployed have power in that others depend on them to be quiescent and comply with the norms of civic life. Interdependence means that domination cannot occur (except through physical force) without the cooperation of the dominated; it offers the opportunity for resistance (Lendman, 2008; Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53; Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14).


 “Actionability”

This perspective accounts for social hierarchy by explaining how, while co-dependants have equal potential resources for power, some contributions (and disruptions) are more actionable than others, and can be used more easily to exert leverage in interdependent relationships. The lines of power in society generally reflect this differing “actionability” (Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53). There are seven main reasons identified by Piven why participants in interdependent relationships would/could not exercise their potential power. The first is that they are unconscious of it; they have not recognised the indispensability of their contribution. The second is, in collectivities, because similarly situated actors are unable to coordinate their activities effectively. The third is because people have insufficient staying power – i.e. they are unable to tolerate the costs of the disruption to a particular interdependent relationship. Fourthly, people will not be successful in exercising power if they are unable to prevent their opponents in a contestation from circumventing them, and thereby undermining their indispensability. Similarly, they must be necessary to the opposing party to prevent them from exiting the relationship entirely in the face of their challenge. They may, additionally, be constrained by third-party leverage. Lastly, people will not be able to exercise interdependent power in the face of the threat or use of physical force (WGPI, 2008a).


Rule-making as an instrument of power

The “actionability” of contributions is also constructed, as behaviours are accorded different levels of legitimacy by societal rules – both legal and customary. Social life is always organised by rules; a prerequisite for cooperation which provides a framework for action. However, rule-making is also an instrument of power, used by people to make others do what they want by delineating permissible and impermissible practices. Rules are often utilised by dominant groups to restrict the activation of interdependent power by weaker groups, through delegitimising the actions available to them; in contrast they grant themselves wide scope for the use of such leverage (Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53; Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14; WGPI, 2008a). One central element of this asymmetrical rule-making process concerns the ideological construction of contributions. The contributions made by dominant groups tend to be defined as the most valuable to systems of social cooperation (despite the fact this does not usually reflect reality), thereby justifying their privileged positions. A part of this is the legal rights of ownership granted to certain actors over things, the possession and supply of which in turn come to be understood as making up their contribution to interdependent relations. A good example is the contemporary legal construction of private property, in which individuals are remunerated for the contributions of the property they “own” – and as a result owners of capital are widely believed to perform the most important functions in the processes of production (Albert, 2004, pp. 28-42; Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53). The ability of particular actors to exercise power derived from interdependence, along with constructed attitudes about their relative contributions to cooperative relations, are subject to change. Groups battle over rules, which activate and inhibit the latent power inherent in interdependencies. Rules can change as a result of the deployment of power resources, but also as a result of mobilisations from below. Many rules generally reflect a degree of compromise between opposing parties, such as with laws that permit strikes but only with conditions attached to them. However, even in such cases, the existing compromises tend to be weighted in favour of dominant groups with more power resources (Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53; Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14).


 The power resources of capital, interdependence, and the retrenchment of workfare

The Government's partial retrenchment of workfare can be explained by combining Piven's theory with Marxist arguments about the power of capital over the state. Anti-workfare campaigners began to apply pressure on companies and charities who had opted into the Government schemes to refuse taking on unpaid workers. They did this through a variety of methods which equated to an exercise of interdependent power. Firstly, they aimed to disrupt the normal processes of business – invading shops and conducting “walks of shame” (in which a group of protesters would demonstrate outside all the chain stores in an area which employ the scheme). This behaviour frightened executives, who were worried about the negative implications for their brand image (and thus their custom); they did not want to appear exploitative (Ball, 2012; BATC, 2012; Topping, 2012). However, most significantly, anti-workfare campaigners and thousands of customers threatened the organisations involved (via social media) with consumer boycotts (Malik, 2012b; Malik, 2012c). This represented a potential disruption of the interdependent relationship between merchant and customer. This in turn led many of the companies to put pressure on the Government to drop the sanctions from the schemes, with partial success1 (BW, 2012; Malik, 2012b; Malik, 2012c; Malik, 2012d).

The utilisation of the boycott tactic (or the threat of it), and the rejection of industrial action, represents an effective exercise of interdependent power. Workfare itself neutralises the interdependent power people have to withdraw their labour from the production process, because it undermines the ability of those involved in such schemes to tolerate the disruption of the relationship, as they could not survive in doing so. This represents, in Piven's terms, a dominant group (in this case the Government in the service of capital) creating rules which deprive the weak in society the means they have of exercising power over the strong. However striking would also have been difficult for workers on normal employment contracts who may have wanted to do so in support of the workfarers. On the one hand it is not an easy thing to do in a practical sense, as workers do not get paid while on strike, and their staying power is limited by their need to keep their families fed, pay their rent etc. (Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14). Moreover, laws regulating labour strikes have always been harsher than laws governing capital strikes, reflecting asymmetrical rule-making and rendering (especially sympathetic/secondary) strikes very problematic (BBC, 2002; Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53). This is particularly the case in modern Britain. Trade unions have lost a great deal of their legitimacy, while workers also suffer weakened labour protections, face competition from a growing temporary workforce (and now workfarers), and are more vulnerable to flight by mobile capital due to globalisation (Jones, 2012; Lendman, 2008). Moreover the mechanisms intrinsic to mass production, identified by Marx, that serve to generate labour solidarity and labour-capital antagonisms, do not apply so readily to the modern service-based economy. Piven explains how strategies of resistance must change in order to meet the challenges of changing circumstances. Her theory supplements Marx as it highlights how the disruptive power of labour deriving from their interdependence with capital is not timelessly applicable – rules determine what interdependencies can be exercised (Piven, 2008, pp. 1-14). The relative success of the boycott tactic can be explained by the fact that, on the one hand, it has not been delegitimised in the same way as strike action has, and, on the other, it meets Piven's seven criteria outlined above for the successful utilisation of interdependent power. Withholding custom when there is a wide variety of shops from which to buy goods is inevitably easier than withholding labour, meaning much greater staying power. Moreover, such a tactic prevents circumnavigation of the “power seeking” party; i.e. unlike the hiring of scabs to undermine workers' strikes, merchants cannot simply “go around” boycotting customers.

While the protesters could not influence the Government directly, they were able to apply successful pressure on capital, using its structural power to their own advantage, to exercise indirect interdependent power over the state. The very implementation of workfare suggests that the Government displayed little concern about its popularity among the marginalised groups who would be victim to such schemes. This is because political participation is stratified – the advantaged tend to participate more in politics than the disadvantaged. The unemployed, particularly, have low voter turnout. Thus interdependent power could not be exercised directly against the state (Piven, 2005, pp. 33-53; Rampbell, 2011; WGPI, 2008b). In contrast, the structural position of capital meant it could exercise leverage through its interdependent relationships with the state as outlined above. This is evidenced by the fact that when the companies involved in the workfare schemes applied pressure on the Government, they were immediately invited in for talks. There is no ostensible reason, if the workfare schemes were purely about getting people back into work, as the Government claimed (rather than being designed to benefit business), why these companies should have been given a platform to express their views on the matter, or why their advice was heeded (Ball, 2012; Malik, 2012c; Topping, 2012). Thus people were able to most successfully exert influence over the state indirectly through utilising the structural power of capital.  


Conclusion

In conclusion, the implementation of workfare and subsequent partial backtracking by the Government can be explained through a combination of Marxist state theory and Piven's notion of interdependent power, and sheds considerable light on power relations within British society. Capital's power over the state is multifaceted, but derives ultimately from its economic power, which it can use to disrupt the prosperous climate upon which state actors and the state itself depend. This means that, whatever else a state may do, it must be concerned with fostering an economic environment which is perceived to be favourable to business. Such perceptions change over time, and in recent years have responded to, and reinforced, a transition from post-War Keynesianism to a SWS as the global economy has become increasingly integrated. Part of this transformation has involved the subordination of social policy to the goal of economic competitiveness. Workfare is a key element of this – it serves to maintain an effective reserve army of labour, provides cheap labour, and weakens the effectiveness of trade unions. Workfare has been approached in different ways by Labour and the Coalition Government, yet their ideological differences remain within a SWS framework. However the structural power of capital does not mean outcomes in British society are predetermined, as is evidenced by the Government's reviewing of some aspects of its workfare package. Members of society with no key power resources can achieve gains by refusing to cooperate in the interdependent relationships that ensure their domination. The effectiveness of such non-cooperation is constrained by a number of factors, including societal rules, the ability to endure withdrawal, and the degree to which the other party is vested in the relationship. These caveats explain why the (threat of) disruption of merchant activity was a successful tactic in indirectly gaining concessions from the Government (the structural power of capital was in this instance used against the interests of capital itself), while threats of labour or electoral non-cooperation were non-existent.

IMF mini case study- are crises really that bad for the IMF?

When speaking of crises, they are usually associated with negative phenomena. After all, the word crisis itself means: “a time of intense difficulty or danger” according to Oxford dictionary. If we look at the protests in UK or 40% jumps in suicide rates in Greece this definition seems like an understatement. But what about the institutions who are meant to stop such crises from happening in the first place. Surely it should be harmful for  them too, as they have failed on their mission. But, maybe there is more to it?

Each International Economic Organisation (IEO) has a series of functions or roles it has to fulfil. These roles vary from monitoring and advising to enforcing or punishing. If these roles are carried out by separate institutions, the one who has to carry out the monitoring process should really see themselves as failing in their quest. The second type of an institution would have no work if the first one failed, as there would be no punishment to carry out and not “corrections” to be made. But what about if a single institution carries out both roles? The place where this is most evident is by allowing institution to monitor the situation leading up to the crisis and then proposing measures to solve the crisis. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a case in point, especially if we analyse it from a managers point of view.

From an IMF manager’s point of view, monitoring nations is difficult, tedious and not particularly rewarding. One has to have teams to track 197 countries and their governments, analyse what problems are present and what may potentially arise, write reports to governments and have relatively little power. Furthermore, the better an institution does in this role, the less need there is to divert extra resources for states which finance IEOs expenditure. Arguably, the significance of the IMF in particular has waned following the Asian crisis and it was gradually fading into disuse. Because of this, the role becomes relatively uninteresting.

Crisis management or execution, on the other hand, is much more interesting. The example of Asian financial crisis showed that the IMF did not have sufficient funds to correct the situation. Because of this, extra resources were pooled to the Fund. Similarly, the financial crisis of 2009 seemed like a prayer which the BBC called “resurrection” of the IMF. To allow IMF to combat intergovernmental imbalances the G20 proposed to triple IMF loans to 750 billion USD (Walker, 2009). The extra resources have allowed IMF to manage such crises once again thereby increasing the power of the IEO. Furthermore, the target of its loans became relatively developed (Romania, Hungary, Latvia) and developed nations (Iceland, Greece, Portugal). The significance of this is that global crisis tends to empower the IMF. From the perspective of a manager of such an institution, such crises may not be so bad, and may even be desirable.

Based on this simple analysis, it would seem that from the institutions point of view, monitoring could be loosened to allow for crises to occasionally. To avoid such plans, there would have to be costs for an institution to not take such a path. First, there is the human aspect, that prevents people from hurting others and crises are known to bring many casualties. Second, there should be an economic aspect, such as fines, getting fired, reputation downgrade or similar. While the first aspect should be left to sociologists or behaviour economists, the second aspect is lacking. Mr Rodrigo de Rato, the managing director of IMF, left the institution for personal reasons 1 year before the fall of lehman brothers¹ and returned as head of Bancia in 2010. Mr. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, the person in charge during the crisis, left office not because of human casualties caused during the bail outs, but because of rape allegations². In both cases, there was no mechanism to punish the institution for failing monitor the situation leading up to the crisis and rewarded for being the one to safeguard from crisis. This is problematic from a political and economic point of view.

Of course, it is not suggested IMF intentionally pretended not to see the crisis. However, under the current conditions it would have been very logical and rewarding to do so. One option would be to separate the two functions and give it to different departments or even completely different institutions. Another is to hope for the best and trust that humans are either honest or not rational enough to have such a master plan. Either way, even when it comes to crises, it may not be such a bad thing for everyone after all.

Nerijus Cerniauskas

1 http://www.imf.org/external/np/cm/2007/102007a.htm

2 Sudeep Reddy; Bob Davis (19 May 2011). "IMF Director Resigns, Denying Allegations". The Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703509104576331623409445148.html?mod=WSJ_Home_largeHeadline. Retrieved 19 May 2011.

“Fire at Will!" Is There a Case for Weaker Job Protections?

by Jack Copley

The Coalition government is seeking to reshape UK employment law by potentially implementing a number of new measures that would make it far easier to fire workers. This latest attempt by the Con-Dems to assure that they are remembered as one of Britain’s most incompetent and socially damaging governments is typical of their previous policy exploits, in that it has no empirical justification and will likely have immense social costs.

Amongst these measures, bosses wishing to make at least 20 redundancies will have to consult employees only 30 days in advance as opposed to the current 90-day limit, while the number of unfair dismissal cases that reach employment tribunals will be slashed. Furthermore, the Prime Minister has supported a proposal by venture capitalist Adrian Beecroft to allow employers to ‘fire at will’ – making employees who are perceived to be ‘coasting’ redundant without providing an explanation.

The government is rehashing its favourite argument that cutting this ‘red tape’ surrounding employment practices could be vital in spurring the economy and allowing companies to start hiring again. Speaking to the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), Cameron said:

“People who ask ‘what do radical deregulation and reforming employment law have to do with the immediate priority of getting growth?’ miss the point. The answer is simple: If we want a new economy and a new type of growth we have to act to make it possible”.

However, Cameron will have trouble providing the wealth of reliable evidence that is required to justify such a historic restructuring of our employment law – as it does not exist.

According to renowned Oxford economist Andrew Glyn, the argument that deregulating employment protections in Europe would have a significant effect on joblessness is not borne out by evidence from cross-country analyses. The OECD's own data shows that there is no evidence that 'reform' of employment regulation is linked with a significant fall in unemployment. Not only does this argument “lack empirical justification” but also the benefits of employment regulation “in terms of a wage floor, income security, job security and conditions at work are frequently ignored”.

In a wide-ranging analysis of the contemporary economics literature, Harvard Economics Chair and award-winning economist Richard Freeman argues that “researchers have not pinned down the effects, if any” of employment deregulation on economic outcomes such as unemployment. While evidence of the impact of employment deregulation on economic performance has been incredibly illusive, Freeman says that evidence consistently links reductions in job protection (and other employment regulations) with increasing earnings inequality.

Not only is the targeting of employment protection to boost economic growth unsupported by cross-country data, but it is especially ridiculous in reference to this country. The UK has the third lowest employment protections in the OECD – with a job protection ranking that is less than half the OECD average. Trying to squeeze further economic gains out of our already insecure workforce is like going around pawning homeless peoples’ clothes to pay off our national debt, in that any possible increases in employment would be miniscule compared to the social costs.

So what are the social costs?

In the long term, these changes will doubtlessly undermine trade unions’ already desperate efforts to organise employees. Insecure work environments make organising with co-workers, let alone taking strike action, a far riskier venture – especially when bosses hold discretionary firing powers like those they would be granted under these new proposals. Without trying to peer into the future, it is not difficult to imagine how these changes would further depress union activity in this country, making it far easier for the government to chip away further at employment/wage laws and generally act with impunity.

However, of more immediate concern is the psychological effect on employees. A survey released this October by the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development showed that “stress is, for the first time, the most common cause of long-term sickness absence for both manual and non-manual employees”. They link this explicitly with job insecurity.

“Employers planning to make redundancies in the next six months are significantly [18%] more likely to report an increase in mental health problems among their staff”.

In fact, analyses of job security and mental illness in Australia robustly suggest that an insecure working environment is just as damaging to mental health as unemployment – leading researchers to beg employers to “take the mental health of their employees as seriously as they would their physical safety”.

How sadistic must the Coalition be to propose measures that will further jeopardise the mental wellbeing of Britain’s already insecure and stress-ridden workforce when there is absolutely no solid evidence that it will have any positive impact on the economy? To what level would our government stoop to wring a single drop of growth out of our economy without actually spending?

What the government and the CBI view as ‘red tape’ is to ordinary people an assurance that when they go to sleep at night they can be confident that they will have a job in the morning. An assurance that they will have a means of supporting themselves and their families when they wake up. It is an issue that is intrinsically linked to mental health, alcohol/drug abuse, domestic violence, and societal wellbeing – an issue that we cannot afford to act on with such an absence of justification. 

"Has (this form of) Capitalism Failed?" - Public Debate 2011

Here is our debate we co-hosted with University of Birmingham Debating Society entitled "This House Believes this form of Capitalism has failed and needs replacing". Well worth a watch ;-)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QscRfcsuA54

A plea for new Left thinking - Introduction

By Leander Jones

The economic crisis that began in 2008 and the austerity measures that followed in many countries have started to breed the first significant signs of discontent in the West for many years. Such episodes have exposed the extensive corruption and double standards rife within the circles of the political and financial elites, and have made people aware for the first time in a generation the extent to which our Western “democracies” are controlled and held to ransom by a powerful few. The more aware members of the public are also increasingly becoming concerned with other problems we face, principally the environmental crisis; while others, particularly immigrant communities, have learned that our wars are rarely fought for just causes. Tension is rising; people are becoming more and more frustrated with the way things are, as well as un-trusting of those who claim to represent us. Yet I see this anger beginning to turn to cynicism and a feeling of helplessness; people are sure that things aren't right but they are bewildered about what to do to change things.

Some look to the past for answers. Yet it is clear to many that this is not the way forward. The old models are exactly that – old; and they are crippled and dying. I read an article this week about the “reforms” that are going on in Cuba; the plan is essentially to implement a neoliberal programme which involves laying off millions of public sector workers in a desperate attempt to get the economy moving after 50 years of stagnation. The official explanation during the whole Communist era for the dysfunctional economy has been the US trade embargo imposed on the island, which is undoubtedly part of the problem. Yet there has been a widespread recognition in recent years that the problem is much deeper – with even Fidel Castro admitting recently that the Cuban model had failed. This is symptomatic of a worldwide disillusionment with the traditional alternatives that are offered by the left-wing, and it has led many to resign themselves to what they see as the inevitability of neoliberal capitalism, while others have turned to more extreme and dangerous solutions – from religious fundamentalism to far-right racist extremism.

I think it is time the left stood up and admitted their addiction to out-of-date doctrines, and begun to seriously tackle their bad habits – from sectarianism, to utopianism, to dogmatism, to authoritarianism – in a coherent and systematic way, through a process of self-criticism and re-evaluation of their methods and even their fundamental principles. Without doing this we risk standing idly by, blinded by our now well-developed cataracts, while the world around us dives head first into catastrophe.

(This aims to be the beginning of an article series for the expression and discussion of new ideas. Contributions are welcome by everybody).

Part 1: Reform vs. Revolution - a false dichotomy: http://birminghamstudentbroadleft.blogspot.com/2011/06/plea-for-new-left-thinking-part-1.html

Part 2: Communicative Rationality and the new party structure:

http://birminghamstudentbroadleft.blogspot.com/2011/06/plea-for-new-left-thinking-part-2.html

A plea for a new Left thinking - Part 1: Reform vs. Revolution – a false dichotomy

By Leander Jones

The first thing that must be established before I begin is that I regard myself a revolutionary. I consider revolution to mean the fundamental transformation of society, in a way that will end exploitation, oppression, violence, and poverty and will allow for the full self-realisation and flourishing of human beings as individuals and as a collective. I believe that the status quo is fundamentally opposed to these aims, and that the social, political and economic structures that currently reign supreme thus have to be completely overhauled. Now that this is clear I can continue under no false pretences, for I do not wish to trick or deceive.

The reason I chose this title for the article is that this is a debate which has been raging for too long within the left, to the detriment of those on both sides of the divide – it has prevented coordinated action, distracted leftists from more important issues, and generally generated more heat than light. I am going to be audacious enough to argue that both sides in this dispute have got it wrong, each providing important insights into the way forward but neither offering anywhere near the whole truth of the matter. This is not to claim that I know the whole truth, for such claims are ridiculous and lead to the dogmatic dismissal of many aspects of reality that do not fit into one's meta-narrative, but I have some educated suggestions I wish to put forward.

One of the most important leftist thinkers in my opinion, but one which is often overlooked by many (particularly by activists) is Antonio Gramsci. He came up with the idea of “cultural hegemony”: the notion that modern capitalism sustains itself not only through the control of the means of production and the state's institutions by “capitalists”, but through the construction of ideas and norms that support and justify the status quo. He argued that these ideas were so effective at asserting control because of their all-pervasiveness; they infiltrated culture, coming to form the routine practices and conventions that make up every-day life, to the extent that they constitute the very fabric of society – people follow them unconsciously and almost instinctively. Thus seemingly innocent and neutral behaviour is imbued with ideological assumptions and serves to reinforce existing power relations and the system at large. This led him on to argue that to fight and overcome the prevailing hegemonic structures, what was needed was the construction of a “counter-hegemony”. This insight had significant implications. It destroyed the myth that the contradictions inherent within capitalism would lead people automatically towards socialism; simply waiting for conditions to get bad enough would not guarantee that opinions would move in the “right direction”. Rather, people in such scenarios would turn to whatever symbol-system best captured the public imagination – usually what was most familiar to them. It also meant that to change the system it was insufficient merely to seize the reigns of the state, as had hitherto been the focus of left-wing strategy, as this would leave the old hegemonic ideas and practices in place. Legislation by such a left-wing state would fail to transform society in any meaningful way, as the people would have retained their old mindsets/cognitive frames. Their “consciousness” would continue to be based upon the values of the old system. Many previous movements failed to appreciate this, and attempted to coerce people into adopting their programmes using violence – and thus we see a dark history of left-wing “experiments”: the term “Communism” for instance is now synonymous in most people's minds with the worst dictatorships this world has ever seen.

What Gramsci never did sufficiently elucidate – at least in any full and coherent manner – is what concrete steps can be taken to construct this counter-hegemony. This process is obviously multifaceted and complex, and one could think of many tactics which could be adopted without delving too deeply into the matter, for example attempting to influence the education system or the mass media machine. But here I want to focus on one element in particular which I believe is crucial to this process, namely the role of legislative reform. Progressive political, economic and social reforms are useful in themselves because they help people by alleviating their every-day hardships. They are also useful to progressives in that popular reforms popularise the reformers, or those who are seen as responsible for pushing for and winning the reforms. Additionally, success in short-term political battles can engender confidence and generate momentum towards further change. But most importantly reforms can dig institutional paths. There is a political theory known as Historical Institutionalism which explains how institutions (conceptualised broadly as routine practices that are identifiable and widely considered legitimate, both formally in organisations and informally in terms of cultural conduct), once initiated, tend to rigidify into self-perpetuating trajectories, and create path-dependencies which restrict the scope of future decisions. This happens firstly in concrete terms usually because the implementation of legislation involves significant economic costs, meaning that changing paths or reorganising can be very expensive. This therefore creates a “lock in” effect whereby state and societal actors become trapped into certain ways of doing things, corresponding with the rules and constraints imposed by the initial piece of legislation. Secondly, we are creatures of habit, and, as the philosophers J. S. Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville observed, long-established doctrines tend to be accepted as natural and legitimate by the history-illiterate public, regardless of however unnatural or ridiculous they appeared when they were initiated. But thirdly, and most crucially, legislation can shape the very environment individuals find themselves in, and structure peoples' material interests and incentives, as well as direct their social interactions through certain channels and in specific ways which are conducive to fostering particular types of behaviour in the short term, and which over the long term transform people's identities and belief-systems. A good example of this is the massive expansion of home-ownership under Thatcher; a result of her “right to buy” scheme alongside her ending most new council housing projects. While she benignly argued that it gave people a “stake in society” and encouraged model citizenship, what it was in fact designed to do was change people's political behaviour through transforming their material interests. Due to the fact that a large proportion of many people's incomes was now spent on mortgage repayments, increased rates of home-ownership engendered hostility towards “post-war consensus” policies which involved high levels of taxation and public spending. In the long term, as is demonstrated by the “welfare trade-off” theory, this led to an increased proportion of the population identifying themselves as monetary conservatives. We see the same pattern in all countries where home-ownership rates have been expanded in recent decades.

Another example of an institutional path can be seen with the 1977 Bullock Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy set up by Labour PM Harold Wilson. It proposed workers' participation/control in the workplace as a solution to chronic industrial strife. This call for economic democracy was based on a perceived “moral need to extend democracy” in society and in elite circles. Such an argument would be inconceivable nowadays now we have lost our corporatist model of industrial relations (which involved a cooperative relationship between employers, Government and trade unions), our commitment to full employment, and our reasonably extensive trade union powers. For industrial democracy to be the natural step forward in such a context, rather than a radical one, highlights the degree to which institutional pathways determine trajectories and outcomes – particularly now the political paradigm has shifted and such a move is almost unimaginable.

All this means that public policy has a vital role (although by no means the only role) to play in the revolutionary process, in Western democracies at least, if legislation can be used to engender progressive norms and expectations. I stress again that I conceive of revolution as a radical transformation of society, not as a single moment of (potentially violent) upheaval; although I appreciate that in some circumstances this process may culminate in such a moment (usually in more repressive states) – but this is not an end in itself. If violence is viewed as a constructive tool rather than merely a means of throwing off the yoke of the old repressive political system, it is bound to lead to the creation of a militaristic society.

This may lead some “revolutionaries” to argue that I am advocating reformism. Reformism, they say, is limited in scope in that it merely aims to tinker around the edges of what is a fundamentally flawed social and economic system. To achieve any true human emancipation we have to totally transform society, so that all forms of alienation are eliminated, social relations are amiable and really are “social”, and the correct conditions exist for individual self-realisation and the fulfilment of full human potential on a personal and collective level. And I would agree with all of these assertions; but using these against my argument fundamentally misses its point. Reforms, seen as stepping stones towards the attainment of wider goals, are not the same as reformism – which by its nature has limited goals.

The fundamental transformation of society cannot happen overnight. Legislative reforms can play a vital role in directing us through the chaos of the political jungle, digging a path that will lead us to the clearing on the other side.

A plea for new Left thinking - Introduction:
http://birminghamstudentbroadleft.blogspot.com/2011/06/plea-for-new-left-thinking-introduction.html

A plea for new Left thinking - Part 2: Communicative Rationality and the new party structure:
http://birminghamstudentbroadleft.blogspot.com/2011/06/plea-for-new-left-thinking-part-2.html

A plea for a new Left thinking - Part 2: Communicative Rationality and the new party structure

By Leander Jones

In my last article I established that reform vs. revolution is a false dichotomy because legislation can be used to dig institutional paths which can shift people's material interests and fundamental attitudes towards progressive ends.

My argument thus far is perhaps overly-abstract and may sound like crypto-normative apologism for, or theoretical contortion used to justify, the same old methods of Parliamentarianism that have been tried, and which have failed, so many times in the past. A major problem with Parliamentary socialist or left-wing parties is that, although they may initially derive from, represent, and have popular support among, those they strive to help – namely the poor, the oppressed, the discriminated against – the nature of the Parliamentary system insulates them from the real world, while their undemocratic party structures bureaucratises and corrupts their politics. They thus eventually become a separate elite political class alienated from the people, and survive only through a combination of anachronistic electoral systems and the control and manipulation of state functions and resources.

What I am proposing is a simple concept – one that has been the main driving force behind progressive change throughout history; that is, democracy, although not as commonly conceived. By democracy I mean the supreme power being vested in the people, so that they do not only live their lives in the freest way possible, but so that they shape their external environment and the very context in which they exercise their freedom.

Behind this conception of democracy lies an assumption: that people know what is best for their own lives, and that self-determination is the only path to self-realisation and true happiness. But I hear the elitists rapping at the door. There is a huddle of them, each wearing tail coats, pin-striped suits, or designer jackets, all clamouring to tell me about how the people are not qualified to rule themselves, and how they are too stupid and animalistic to be given complete freedom of choice. But although I bar the door to these elitists, some of what they are saying reaches my ears, and seems to ring true. When we hear the opinions of the unwashed masses, they are often repulsive to our sensitive liberal ears – they usually involve a confused mixture of bigotry, xenophobia, and hatred of “benefit scroungers”, alongside a nostalgic support for social-democratic full employment and progressive taxation. These people also, a lot of the time, frankly do appear stupid, abusive and“animalistic” like the elitists claim.

Thus is exposed a fundamental flaw in democracy: the people (at least formally) have political power, but they have not the education to wield that power wisely. This is a natural and, although its effects can be mitigated by a high quality and egalitarian education system, largely inevitable result of the class divides that pervade any capitalist society. The elitist solution to this problem always revolves around the idea of a Platonic “Philosopher King”, or some derivative of the concept. However authoritarianism is not acceptable for a number of reasons – crucially because such systems are not conducive to the maximisation of human potential – but a discussion on this topic is beyond the remit of this article.

Massive tangent, read if you have too much time on your hands

But neither is it acceptable for some leftist “vanguard” to simply seize the state apparatus in the hope of legislating their way into a classless society – the phenomenon of class is much more complex than this. The merits and flaws of a state-commanded economy aside (and also if we ignore the potential of this type of tactic to slide into dictatorship), such a strategy implies an anachronistic understanding of class as purely based on one's relation to the means of production: if you own capital then you are a “capitalist”, if you don't then you must sell your labour power and are thus “working class” - with each class having fundamentally homogeneous interests. Yet by this definition the working class would make up about 95% of the population (at least), and would include people as diverse as non-skilled manual workers, peasant farmers, immigrant contract-workers, white-collar office employees, business managers and corporate lawyers. Society thus should not only be divided into only two classes; at the very least a distinction has to be made between the “coordinator class” and the working class (and even this is perhaps too minimalistic because it does not recognise the distinction between small and large business owners, different types of capital, skilled and non-skilled labour, public and private sector workers etc.). The coordinator class is that which has a monopoly on empowering work: the “tasks that not only brighten their spirits and attentiveness, but also provide them with information critical to intelligent decision-making” and which crucially involve responsibility for, and the coordination of, others. This class includes the majority of professionals, such as corporate lawyers, business managers, those in important positions in the public sector etc. This is in contrast to the working class, who are relegated to performing disempowering work that is rote, unpleasant and intellectually un-stimulating – not involving any conceptual tasks. For an explanation of this three-tiered class division read/watch Michael Albert on “participatory economics”. This means that non-capitalist societies such as the Soviet Union, which abolish their property-owning classes, still retain class divisions if they do not recognise this further fundamental divide. The abolition of this class divide thus requires more than merely state ownership of the means of production.

But anyway, I digress. If the people are too ignorant to govern themselves, what hope is there for democracy? Here I am going to explain two things which I think have the potential to change the face of politics and revitalise the Left in this country:

1. Communicative rationality
2. The structure of future political parties/organisations

1 - Before I continue I need to explain a fairly obvious, yet often overlooked, phenomenon. This is the idea of “communicative rationality”: the notion that communication and dialogue with others can lead not only to a greater understanding of the subject in question, but to enhanced general reason and the capacity for critical-thinking, by the individuals involved. There are numerous psycho-linguistic explanations for this process, such as that offered by Jurgen Habermas (although I wouldn't try and read him because you'll only end up with a headache and more confused than when you started) who argued that there is an innate “will to reason” in communicative interaction. But besides these complex neuro-theories, much can be learned by mere observation of one's surroundings – it doesn't take a genius to work out that dialogue and debate forces people to utilise logic and reason and encourages them to analyse their own (and others') ideas and evaluate their coherence. This process often means that people's beliefs move from being under-analysed assumptions to rational convictions, while ideas that come to be identified as erroneous are scrapped and others are adopted which correspond more consistently with their belief systems. I appreciate that speech can and often does lead to false beliefs and the dogmatic adoption of prevailing ideas, but the important thing distinguishing these two scenarios is the power relationships of those involved. The former requires there to be, as much as is possible, a dialogue between equal partners; the latter exists where there is hierarchy between the people involved – either formal or informal – which places certain members on a pedestal, in a teacher-like position, and others on lower ground, as pupils that are to unquestioningly accept whatever the teachers say. Furthermore, decision-making based on strategic competition between self-interested groups hinders reflective reasoning and often leads to irrational outcomes. Thus for discursive reasoning processes to be successful certain procedural requirements must be met which allow for equal social inclusion of all parties, the minimisation of power differences, and increased transparency of actors' intentions.

2 - A problem with traditional leftist parties, as I mentioned above, is that the leaders become separated from the people they are supposed to represent. But beyond this, their doctrinaire approach and general structure often mean that their ideas become quickly out of date and out of touch with the people and thus cease to resonate with the population as they no longer embody people's values or respond to their every-day problems and needs. This is certainly a big part of the reason the Left in this country is in dire straits, and has eked out a mere subsistence in the political wilderness for many years – surviving only on ever-sparser scraps of theoretical truisms that survive from the cultivation of past civilisations. So what is needed is for leftist organisations to provide a genuine voice for the voiceless: no more top-down dogma, no more putting words in people's mouths, and no more assuming we know what is best for others. How can this be done? There is a small political party I have heard about which I think came up with part of the answer. The innovative idea behind this party is that its members completely decide its policies – from putting forward the initial policy suggestions to voting on the final manifesto points. This would of course lead to policies that completely coincide with people's wishes, but not necessarily with their true interests (I know I will have a post-structuralist shouting at me about this point, but I hope they will grant me the luxury of assuming at least that some wishes are more enlightened than others). The problem with the idea behind this party is that it is largely populist; it plays up to people's prejudices and misjudgements – its policies are the manifestation of the whims of an unreflecting populace. What is needed is instead an organisation that responds to the needs of a reflecting public.

Thus what we need are communicative forums for discussion and the enhancement of rational thinking that can act as the source of policies for such an organisation – which will then be not only democratic but progressive in nature, and which will create a more enlightened momentum within society. It will only be legitimate for participants in these forums to decide on policy, rather than any individual person; but ideally all would participate. This organisation could start off small, pressuring local councils into implementing programmes decided upon by local residents. If this was successful it could stand in local elections, with any person elected held directly accountable to these decision-making forums and subject to regular questioning on their activities; they would also of course be recalled should their efforts be deemed insufficient. If this strategy succeeds then the organisation should naturally be extended to the national level. The policies pushed for and implemented by such an organisation/party would be based on enlightened collective deliberation and make a real positive difference to people's lives. The resulting legislation will play a part in constructing counter-hegemonic institutional paths due to the fact that the exercise of communicative rationality will lead to the scrutinising and challenging of the norms, practices and structures of the status quo. But even more crucially, the very process of participation in these democratic forums is itself emancipatory and empowering. Participation in decision-making serves to shift expectations with regard to how much control and responsibility people can, and ought to, have over policy and society; this democracy will thus be (one of) the main counter-hegemonic institutions that will revolutionise attitudes and challenge dominating authority. The means is a large part of the ends.

A plea for new Left thinking - Introduction:
http://birminghamstudentbroadleft.blogspot.com/2011/06/plea-for-new-left-thinking-introduction.html

A plea for new Left thinking - Reform vs. Revolution - a false dichotomy:
http://birminghamstudentbroadleft.blogspot.com/2011/06/plea-for-new-left-thinking-part-1.html